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The US Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. dramatically expanded the subnational states’ power 
to require remote suppliers to collect taxes on in-bound sales to local consumers by repudiating the pre-existing, judicially 
created constitutional rule limiting the states’ authority to enforce such collection obligations to those suppliers with an in-state 
physical presence and replacing it with a ‘nexus’ rule based on ‘economic and virtual contacts’. The state legislatures reacted 
quickly and almost unanimously to the Wayfair decision by adopting rules imposing sales tax collection obligations on remote 
suppliers whose sales exceeded specified dollar or transaction thresholds. The states have imposed similar obligations on 
marketplace platforms that increasingly facilitate online cross-border sales. In principle, these post-Wayfair tax collection 
obligations imposed on remote suppliers apply equally to interstate and international cross-border sales and to domestic and 
foreign suppliers. As a practical matter, however, the states confront greater challenges in enforcing these obligations in the 
international context. Under the US Constitution’s ‘Full Faith and Credit Clause’, judgments against domestic suppliers that 
fail to comply with a state’s tax collection obligations may be enforced against such suppliers in other states where the suppliers 
are located. By contrast, under the so-called ‘revenue rule’ that is widely respected in the international context, judgments 
against foreign suppliers generally may not be enforced in the foreign suppliers’ home jurisdiction. Despite differences in the 
legal and practical mechanisms available to state tax authorities in enforcing tax obligations upon foreign as distinguished from 
domestic suppliers, states nevertheless have a variety of tools at their disposal to enforce or encourage tax collection by foreign 
suppliers, and there are other reasons why foreign suppliers may choose to comply with state collection requirements with 
respect to online sales.   
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Any discussion of subnational state1 taxation of cross-border online sales2 in the United 
States must begin with a recognition of the significance of the US Supreme Court’s 
2018 decision in South Dakota v Wayfair, Inc.3 In Wayfair, the Court dramatically 
expanded the states’ power to require remote suppliers to collect taxes on in-bound sales 
to local consumers by repudiating the pre-existing, judicially created constitutional rule 
limiting the states’ authority to enforce such collection obligations to those suppliers 
with an in-state physical presence. By replacing a constitutional ‘nexus’ rule based 
entirely on physical presence with one based on ‘economic and virtual contacts’,4 the 
Court not only consigned much of the earlier US experience with the collection of tax 
on online sales to the dustbin of history,5 at least for those with no physical presence in 
a state, but it also ushered in a new era of state law and practice explicitly embracing 
the states’ expanded powers to tax online sales. 
This article reflects the divide between the pre-Wayfair and the post-Wayfair world. The 
first portion of the article describes the US law governing the collection of tax on online 
sales prior to the Court’s decision in Wayfair.6 The second (and more extended) portion 
of the article examines the Wayfair decision, its implications for collection of tax on 
online sales, and the states’ response to the decision.7 Before turning to the principal 
focus of the inquiry, however, the article provides a brief overview of the US retail sales 
tax (RST), particularly in its application to cross-border sales, to avoid ‘lost in 
translation’ problems in any comparative analysis of the US retail sales taxes and the 
Australian goods and services tax (GST).8  
                                                     
1 Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent references to ‘state’ or ‘states’ in this article are to US 
subnational states, as distinguished from national states. 
2 The first sentence of this article refers to ‘cross-border online sales’ rather than simply to ‘online sales’ 
because if all relevant participants in a taxable sale (eg, seller, purchaser, platform, or other intermediary) 
are located in the same jurisdiction, and if all of the elements of the sale (eg, purchase, payment, delivery) 
occur in the same jurisdiction, it does not raise most of the challenging issues associated with online sales, 
namely, how to implement and enforce a consumption tax when one or more of the key participants or 
elements of the sale are not located in the jurisdiction with the taxing rights. However, to avoid the repetition 
of the phrase ‘cross-border’ every time the article refers to ‘on-line sales’, the ensuing discussion generally 
refers simply to issues associated with ‘collection of tax on online sales’ with the understanding that the 
principal focus of the discussion is on the collection of tax on online sales in the cross-border context. 
3 South Dakota v Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).  
4 Ibid 2099. 
5 In particular, it rendered much of the pre-existing law and practice focused on ‘workarounds’ to the 
physical-presence rule obsolete – or, perhaps more accurately, unduly complicated or beside the point – 
because physical presence, while still a sufficient condition for constitutionally recognised power to require 
remote sellers to comply with online tax obligations, is no longer a necessary condition. These 
‘workaround’ are discussed briefly in section 3.3 and in detail in Jerome R Hellerstein, Walter Hellerstein 
and John A Swain, State Taxation (Thomson Reuters, 3rd ed, 2019 rev) para. 19.03. 
6 See section 3. 
7 See sections 4 and 5. 
8 This article draws freely from the author’s previous work in this area, most notably, Hellerstein et al, 
above n 5.  
 
 





2. OVERVIEW OF US RETAIL SALES TAX (RST) 
Although there is no broad-based federal9 consumption tax in the United States,10 45 of 
the 50 states and the District of Columbia, as well as thousands of local jurisdictions,11 
impose general RSTs. The general sales tax is one of the two primary sources of state 
tax revenue along with the state personal income tax. During the 12-month period 
ending in March 2019, sales taxes yielded USD 331 billion or 31.7 per cent of state tax 
revenues.12 
In principle, an RST is a single-stage levy on consumer expenditures; ie, it applies to 
final sales of goods and services for personal use and consumption. Accordingly, a 
theoretically ideal retail sales tax would apply to all consumer purchases of goods and 
services, and it would exclude business inputs from the tax base. The RST in force in 
most of the American states, however, deviates from this theoretical norm in two 
fundamental respects. First, the state RST is confined largely to sales of tangible 
personal property (goods) and applies only selectively (and unevenly) to the sale of 
services.13 Second, the state RST includes substantial business purchases within the tax 
base.14 
2.1 Application of US RST tax to cross-border transactions 
The taxable event under most state RSTs is the transfer of title or possession of tangible 
personal property for a consideration. Virtually all states treat this transfer as occurring 
at the point of delivery, which is a practical proxy for a destination-basis tax. To 
reinforce the destination-basis character of the sales tax, most states exempt from tax all 
sales for delivery outside the state.15 
Although most state RSTs do not apply generally to services, when the states do tax 
services the rules for the place of taxation for such services are not as consistent or as 
well established as they are with regard to the place of taxation for sales of goods. 
Following the same destination principle that they employ in connection with the place 
of taxation for sales of goods, some states take the position that services should be taxed 
in the state in which they are delivered or enjoyed, and they exempt services ‘if the 
beneficial use of the service occurs entirely outside the state’.16 Other states, however, 
take the position that a sale of services takes place in – and is taxable by – the state in 
which the services are performed, even though the services are in effect ‘delivered’ and 
consumed outside the state.17 Finally, states sometimes take the position that a sale of 
                                                     
9 Throughout this discussion, the term ‘federal’ refers to the national level of government in the United 
States as distinguished from the ‘state’ or subnational level of government. 
10 There are, however, a number of selective excise taxes imposed at the national level on specified types 
of consumption, such as fuel, telecommunications, and air transportation. 
11 With some notable exceptions, most RSTs imposed at the local level are administratively integrated with 
the RST at the state level and amount, in substance, simply to a local rate increase in the state sales tax. 
12 US Census Bureau, National Totals of State Government Revenue by Type of Tax (2019), 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2019/econ/qtax/historical.html. During the same period, the state 
personal income tax yielded USD 382 billion or 38.4 per cent of such collections. Ibid. 
13 Hellerstein et al, above n 5, 12.04[1]. 
14 Ibid 12.06[1]. 
15 Ibid 18.02[1]. This is analogous to zero-rating exports under a value added tax/goods and services tax 
(VAT/GST). 
16 In re State and Municipal Sales and Use Tax Liability of K.O. Lee Co., 489 NW2d 606, 610 (SD 1992) 
(quoting the statute). 
17 Hellerstein et al, above n 5, 18.05. 
 
 





services may be apportioned among the states in which they are used depending on the 
extent of use.18  
2.2 The states’ constitutional incompetence to tax cross-border sales and the development of 
complementary use taxes 
Under the US Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause of the federal 
Constitution,19 the states lack the constitutional power to impose a sales tax on goods or 
services purchased in other states or in interstate commerce because ‘to impose a tax on 
such a such transaction would be to project its powers beyond its boundaries and to tax 
an interstate transaction’.20 The constitutional prohibition on the states’ taxation of sales 
consummated outside their borders or in interstate commerce created a troublesome gap 
in their consumption tax structures. The gap created two concerns. First, states feared 
the loss of business that local merchants would suffer when prospective customers made 
out-of-state or interstate purchases to avoid in-state sales tax liability. Second, states 
feared the loss of revenue they would incur as a result of the diversion of sales tax to 
non-tax states. To deal with this potential loss of business and revenue, states enacted 
‘complementary’ or ‘compensating’ use taxes on goods (and, as appropriate, on 
services21) purchased outside the state and brought into the state for use. 
Compensating use taxes are functionally equivalent to sales taxes. They typically are 
levied upon the use, storage, or other consumption in the state of goods (and, as 
appropriate, to services22) that have not been subjected to a sales tax. The use tax 
imposes an exaction equal in amount to the sales tax that would have been imposed on 
the sale of the goods or services in question if the sale had occurred within the state’s 
taxing jurisdiction. The state overcomes the constitutional hurdle of taxing an out-of-
state or interstate sale by imposing the tax on a subject within its taxing power – the use, 
storage, or consumption of goods or services within the state.23 In principle, then, the 
in-state purchaser stands to gain nothing by making an out-of-state or interstate purchase 
free of sales tax because it will ultimately be saddled with an identical use tax when the 
                                                     
18 In this connection, it may be worth observing that, with rare and isolated exceptions (see, eg, the Mobile 
Telecommunications Sourcing Act, 114 Stat. 626 (28 July 2000), codified at 4 USC section 116 et seq. 
(Westlaw 2019), limiting states’ power to tax charges for mobile telecommunications services to the state 
of the customer’s usual residence), Congress has not exercised its unquestioned power to require uniform 
place-of-taxation rules for state RSTs.  
19 The Commerce Clause by its terms is simply an affirmative grant of power to Congress to ‘regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes’: US 
Constitution, article I, section 8, clause 3. Nevertheless, the US Supreme Court has long construed the 
clause as imposing implicit restraints on state authority, even when Congress has not acted. Under this so-
called ‘negative’ or ‘dormant’ Commerce Clause doctrine, the Court has consistently struck down taxes 
that, in the Court’s judgment, discriminate against or otherwise burden interstate commerce. See generally 
Hellerstein et al, above n 5, ch 4. 
20 McLeod v J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 US 327, 328 (1944). Some of the Court’s earlier pronouncements no 
longer reflect contemporary Commerce Clause doctrine. Specifically, the Court has held that states may 
impose taxes on interstate commerce ‘against a Commerce Clause challenge when the tax is applied to an 
activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against 
interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State’: Complete Auto Transit, Inc. 
v Brady, 430 US 274, 279 (1977); see generally Hellerstein et al, above n 5, 4.11[2], 4.12. Nevertheless, 
the Court’s earlier doctrine informed and continues to inform the current structure of state RSTs. 
21 As already noted, state RSTs generally are applied only selectively to services, and state use taxes are 
correspondingly applied only to those services that are taxable by the state.  
22 See generally Hellerstein et al, above n 5, 16.12 (explaining application of use tax to services). 









goods or services are used in the taxing state. Taken together, the sales and use tax 
provide a uniform scheme of taxation on goods or services purchased within the state 
and goods or services24 purchased outside the state for ‘storage, use, or consumption’ 
within the state. Every one of the 45 states (and the District of Columbia) that imposes 
a sales tax also imposes a compensating use tax. 
In order to avoid double taxation of multistate transactions, every state imposing a use 
tax allows a credit against its use taxes for sales or use tax paid to other states. It is clear 
that such a credit is now required by federal constitutional law, at least if a state provides 
a credit against (or exemption from) the state’s use tax for goods or services purchased 
within the state and taxed under the state’s sales tax (as all states do). Otherwise there 
would be discrimination against out-of-state purchases.25 
3. US EXPERIENCE IN THE COLLECTION OF TAX ON ONLINE SALES PRIOR TO WAYFAIR 
3.1 Constitutional restraints on the states’ power to require out-of-state vendors to collect use 
taxes on interstate sales: the online sales problem 
State sales taxes generally are collected by the vendor from the purchaser, and all states 
have some system for registering vendors as collection agents. Once a vendor registers 
with the state, it is authorised to make sales at retail, and it is required to collect and 
remit taxes on taxable sales. Accordingly, when a registered vendor within the state 
delivers taxable goods or services to a purchaser within the state, it must collect the sales 
tax due, unless the purchaser presents it with a certificate establishing that the sale is 
exempt (eg, a resale certificate) or that the purchaser has a ‘direct pay’ permit allowing 
it to self-assess the tax and pay it directly to the taxing authority. A vendor is ordinarily 
liable (either primarily or secondarily) for tax on any taxable transaction, whether or not 
it collects it from the purchaser. There are no constitutional difficulties in requiring the 
registered vendor to collect the sales tax. 
When interstate sales of taxable goods or services are involved, the use tax rather than 
the sales tax is applicable.26 As explained above, it is beyond dispute that the purchaser 
is legally liable for the tax on the use of the taxable goods or services within the taxing 
state.27 It is also settled law, as the US Supreme Court declared in one of the seminal 
                                                     
24 States clearly possess the same constitutional authority to levy use taxes on services that they possess to 
levy use taxes on goods. Nevertheless, because states levy taxes on services only selectively, they have not 
exercised such authority over taxable services purchased from out-of-state service providers to the same 
extent that they have exercised such authority over goods purchased from out-of-state sellers. Hellerstein 
et al, above n 5, 16.12[2]. 
25 See Oklahoma Tax Commission v Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 US 175 (1995); Walter Hellerstein, Michael 
McIntyre and Richard Pomp, ‘Commerce Clause Restraints on State Taxation after Jefferson Lines’ (1995) 
51(1) Tax Law Review 47, 66-67. 
26 See section 2.2. 
27 In the United States, even though the registered vendor ordinarily must collect the sales and use tax, the 
purchaser is often the legal ‘taxpayer’ under the sales tax and is always the legal ‘taxpayer’ under the use 
tax. The registered vendor has secondary liability if it fails to collect the sales or use taxes due from the 
‘taxpayer’. Thus, consumers are regarded as ‘taxpayers’ and, in principle, could be required to file sales or 
use tax returns on items they purchase from non-compliant or non-registered vendors. While it is generally 
impractical to attempt to collect retail sales and use taxes directly from individual consumers, a number of 
states have a line on their individual income tax returns requiring individual consumers to pay use taxes on 
any goods they have acquired on which they have not paid sales taxes. Nina Manzi, ‘Use Tax Collection 
on Income Tax Returns in Other States’, Minnesota House of Representatives Policy Brief (2015), 
 
 





cases establishing the constitutionality of the use tax and the vendor’s obligation to 
collect the tax, that making ‘the distributor the tax collector for the State is a familiar 
and sanctioned device’.28 In the use tax context, however, the implementation of this 
‘familiar and sanctioned device’ of making the vendor the collection agent for the state 
can give rise to constitutional difficulties that do not arise in the sales tax context. 
Because the use tax generally applies to transactions involving interstate sales, and the 
vendor often has little or no presence in the state, it raises the constitutional question 
whether the state has the jurisdictional power to require the vendor to register and collect 
the tax. The US Supreme Court has declared that it is a ‘fundamental requirement of 
both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses that there be “some definite link, some 
minimum connection between a state and the person, property, or transaction it seeks to 
tax”’.29 This so-called ‘nexus’ requirement derives from the virtually axiomatic 
proposition that the exercise of a state’s tax power over a taxpayer or its activities is 
justified by the ‘protection, opportunities and benefits’30 the state confers upon the 
taxpayer or its activities. If the state lacks the “definite link” or ‘minimum connection’ 
with the taxpayer or its activities, it has not ‘given anything for which it can ask 
return’.31 In the context of use taxes, the essential question becomes whether there is a 
sufficient connection with (and hence jurisdiction over) the out-of-state vendor to justify 
the state’s enlisting the vendor to collect tax on its sales to in-state purchasers.32 
3.2 The physical-presence nexus standard for requiring out-of-state vendors to collect use tax 
on interstate sales: 1967-2018 
In 1967, in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v Department of Revenue,33 the US Supreme 
Court first considered the question whether a state could require an out-of-state vendor 
with no physical presence in the state to collect a use tax on goods sold to in-state 
purchasers. In that case, Illinois sought to compel a Missouri mail-order seller to collect 
a use tax on goods sold to Illinois purchasers. National Bellas Hess challenged the tax 
under both the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the US Constitution.34 After 
reiterating that there must be ‘some definite link, some minimum connection between a 
state and the person, property or transaction its seeks to tax’,35 and that such a ‘link’ or 
‘connection’ between the out-of-state vendor and the state was a prerequisite to 
imposing a use tax collection duty on the vendor, the Court concluded that Illinois had 
exceeded the limits established by its precedents. The Court stated it ‘has never held 
                                                     
https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/usetax.pdf. Such levies are often colloquially referred to as 
‘taxes on honesty’. 
28 General Trading Co. v State Tax Commission, 322 US 335, 338 (1944). 
29 Allied-Signal, Inc. v Director, Division of Taxation, 504 US 768, 777 (1992) (quoting Miller Bros. v 
Maryland, 347 US 340, 344-345 (1954)). 
30 Wisconsin v J.C. Penney Co., 311 US 435, 444 (1940). 
31 Ibid.  
32 When a vendor (or other party) collects and remits the tax on behalf of the purchaser (as in the typical 
retail sales or use tax transaction), the first part of the nexus inquiry focuses on the connection between the 
state and the tax collector rather than the taxpayer, at least when the tax collector is not the legal ‘taxpayer’. 
See above n 27. In such cases, there ordinarily is no question about the state’s nexus with the ‘taxpayer’, 
who is usually an in-state purchaser. 
33 National Bellas Hess, Inc. v Department of Revenue, 386 US 753 (1967). 
34 While the Court has construed the Commerce Clause as a restraint on the states’ power to burden 
interstate commerce, it has construed the Due Process Clause as a restraint on the states’ power to assert 
jurisdiction over out-of-state persons and to engage in extraterritorial taxation: Moorman Manufacturing 
Co. v Bair, 437 US 267, 273 (1978). 
35 Miller Bros. v Maryland, 347 US 340, 344-345 (1954). 
 
 





that a State may impose the duty of use tax collection and payment upon a seller whose 
only connection with customers in the State is by common carrier or the United States 
mail’.36 The Court focused specifically on the lack of harmonisation in the states’ RST 
regimes, which created intolerable burdens on distance sellers if they could be required 
to collect use taxes in all states and localities into which they shipped the goods they 
sold: 
The many variations in rates of tax, in allowable exemptions, and in 
administrative and record-keeping requirements could entangle National’s 
interstate business in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to local 
jurisdictions with no legitimate claim to impose ‘a fair share of the cost of the 
local government’. 37 
Declaring that the ‘very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to ensure a national 
economy free from such unjustifiable local entanglements’,38 the Court held the 
assessment unconstitutional. 
In 1992, when the digital economy was still in its infancy, the Supreme Court revisited 
the question it had addressed 25 years earlier in Bellas Hess in Quill Corp. v North 
Dakota.39 In Quill, the Court reaffirmed the rule that the Commerce Clause bars a state 
from imposing a use tax collection duty on an out-of-state seller with no physical 
presence in the state. In so holding, however, the Court made it clear that the Due 
Process Clause was no bar to the imposition of a use tax collection obligation on such 
sellers as long as the out-of-state seller was purposefully directing its efforts towards 
residents of the taxing state. Instead, the Court in Quill rested the physical-presence 
requirement entirely on the Commerce Clause. 
The significance of the precise constitutional basis for the physical-presence 
requirement for nexus with an out-of-state vendor may seem like a lawyer’s debating 
point, but it was important with respect to Congress’s power to legislate on this question 
in the future and to provide a broad solution to the tax collection problems associated 
with distance selling and digital commerce. Congress is clearly free to change the rules 
that the Court articulates under the Commerce Clause, whereas there is serious question 
whether Congress can change the rules the Court articulates under the Due Process 
Clause.40 Consequently, by resting the physical-presence requirement of nexus entirely 
on its interpretation of the Commerce Clause, the Court made it clear that Congress had 
the power to change this rule should it see fit to do so, perhaps in conjunction with a 
requirement that the states harmonise their sales tax regimes to remove the burden that 
the existing patchwork of state and local sales tax laws imposes on remote sellers. 
3.3 States’ responses to the physical-presence nexus standard for requiring out-of-state 
vendors to collect use tax on interstate sales 
During the half-century that states were constitutionally prohibited from requiring 
vendors without physical presence in the state from collecting use taxes on interstate 
                                                     
36 National Bellas Hess, Inc. v Department of Revenue, 386 US 753, 758 (1967). 
37 Ibid 759-760 (footnotes omitted). 
38 Ibid 760. 
39 Quill Corp. v North Dakota 504 US 298 (1992). 
40 See generally Walter Hellerstein, ‘Federal Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to 
Legislate Regarding State Taxation of Electronic Commerce’ (2000) 53(4) National Tax Journal 1307. 
 
 





sales, states adopted various administrative and legislative strategies to address the tax 
enforcement problem that the physical-presence rule created. These strategies broadly 
shared the same objective: to identify an actor or activity with an in-state physical 
presence that could be attributed to the out-of-state vendor thereby establishing the 
constitutionally required physical presence for the imposition of a tax collection 
obligation upon the out-of-state vendor. Among the strategies pursued by the states, 
which often spawned litigation over their constitutionality with varying results 
depending on the precise facts at issue, were the following: 
 relying on the out-of-state vendor’s own in-state activities, including 
- delivery of merchandise in the out-of-state vendor’s own trucks;  
- temporary or occasional presence of out-of-state vendor’s employees 
in the state; 
- attendance at trade shows by out-of-state vendor’s employees; 
- passage of title to or temporary ownership of out-of-state vendor’s 
goods sold to in-state customers;  
- licensing of out-of-state vendor’s software (characterised as tangible 
personal property) to in-state customers;41   
 attributing to the out-of-state vendor the in-state activities of third parties, 
including: 
- activities of independent contractors acting as the out-of-state vendor’s 
in-state sales representatives; 
- activities of the independent in-state sales representatives of multi-
level marketing organisations; 
- warranty, repair, or installation services performed within the state by 
independent service providers on behalf of out-of-state vendors; 
- printing services performed within the state for out-of-state vendors; 
- fulfilment services performed within the state for out-of-state vendors;  
- activities of teachers associated with children’s book clubs; 
- common carrier activities exceeding standard services (eg, 
personalised delivery services); 
- activities of in-state suppliers or fabricators operating on behalf of an 
out-of-state vendor;42 
 relying on in-state activities of retail stores operated by corporate affiliates 
of mail-order or online vendor to establish nexus over out-of-state vendor, 
including affiliates’:  
                                                     
41 See generally Hellerstein et al, above n 5, 19.03[2] (describing underlying case law in detail).  
42 See generally ibid 19.03[3] (describing underlying case law in detail).  
 
 





- acceptance of ‘returns’ of purchases from out-of-state vendors at local 
stores; 
- distribution at local stores of discount coupons on behalf of out-of-state 
online vendor.43 
3.3.1 Click-through nexus 
As mail order and other remote sales gradually evolved into online sales with the advent 
of the Internet and the digital economy, states adjusted, or, perhaps more precisely, 
supplemented their strategies to address the RST collection challenges associated with 
the digital economy. One such strategy involved the adoption of so-called ‘click through 
nexus’ statutes that established a presumption of nexus with out-of-state online retailers 
who paid commissions to in-state residents to post links to the online retailers’ web 
sites.44 
3.3.2 Information reporting and notice requirements 
Prior to Wayfair, some states adopted legislation that required non-physically present 
vendors to comply with various information reporting and notice requirements with 
respect to sales made into the state unless they voluntarily agreed to collect tax on those 
sales.45 The rationale for such statutes, which may best be explained by Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s wise observation that ‘[a] page of history is worth a volume of 
logic’,46 was that the courts had drawn a constitutional distinction between states’ 
constitutional power to impose tax collection obligations, for which physical presence 
was required, and their constitutional power to impose tax reporting obligations, for 
which physical presence was not required.47 Although one can understand, as a matter 
of principle, why states would have an interest in acquiring information about inbound 
sales made by vendors over whom they had no authority to require compliance with tax 
collection obligations, a more realistic assessment of such provisions is that they were 
designed to induce sellers ‘voluntarily’ to choose to collect a tax that they could not be 
constitutionally compelled to collect by imposing on them a more burdensome 
alternative of complying with detailed reporting obligations that the state was 
empowered to impose. 
3.3.3 Marketplace platforms 
In the year preceding the US Supreme Court’s decision in Wayfair, a number of state 
legislatures enacted legislation explicitly targeting marketplace platforms48 in 
connection with state sales and use tax administration.49 It was no secret why states had 
                                                     
43 See generally ibid 19.03[4] (describing underlying case law in detail).  
44 See generally ibid 19.04[2] (discussing statutory provisions and related case law in detail). 
45 See generally Eric S Smith, ‘Due Process Implications Related to State Notice and Economic Nexus 
Laws’ (2017) 70(4) Tax Lawyer 833, 855-866 (analysing the Colorado, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Vermont 
statutes). 
46 New York Trust Co. v Eisner, 256 US 345, 349 (1921). 
47 Direct Marketing Ass’n v Brohl, 814 F3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 591 (2016). 
48 The term ‘marketplace platform’ is employed broadly to describe entities that facilitate the sale of 
tangible personal property or services. Most states use the term ‘marketplace facilitator’; other states use 
the term ‘marketplace provider’. See section 5.2 (discussing platform legislation and these terms in more 
detail). 
49 See generally Walter Hellerstein, John A Swain and Jonathan E Maddison, ‘Platforms: The Sequel’ 
(2019) 91 State Tax Notes 7; Hellerstein et al, above n 5, 19.08[7]. 
 
 





begun to focus their attention on marketplace platforms in the sales and use tax context. 
They were concerned with and frustrated by then-existing judicially articulated 
physical-presence nexus restraint on states’ power to require vendors to collect taxes on 
interstate sales to customers in the state. Indeed, three of the first four states that enacted 
platform legislation – Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Washington – made their 
motivations clear in their statements of legislative intent. Thus, in what is generally 
heralded as ‘the nation’s first marketplace nexus provision’,50 Minnesota enacted 
legislation on 30 May 2017, with one of the more unusual ‘effective date’ provisions in 
the annals of state tax law, which declared that its provisions were effective the earlier 
of 
(1) a decision by the United States Supreme Court modifying its decision in Quill 
Corp. v North Dakota, 504 US 298 (1992) so that a state may require retailers 
without a physical presence in the state to collect or remit sales tax; or 
(2) 1 July 2019.51 
Similarly, Washington’s platform-related legislation declared that ‘[t]he legislature 
intends by this act to address the significant harm and unfairness brought about by the 
physical presence nexus rule’.52 Rhode Island, perhaps trying to place itself on firmer 
constitutional ground, declared that ‘it is no longer an undue burden for non-collecting 
retailers to accurately compute, collect, and remit and/or report with respect to their 
sales and use tax obligations to Rhode Island’.53 
To avoid repetition, and to incorporate the significant post-Wayfair modifications of the 
pre-Wayfair legislation into the discussion, state platform legislation is treated in more 
detail in the post-Wayfair portion of this article.54 
4. WAYFAIR AND THE REPUDIATION OF THE PHYSICAL-PRESENCE NEXUS STANDARD FOR 
REQUIRING OUT-OF-STATE VENDORS TO COLLECT TAX ON INTERSTATE SALES 
As the preceding discussion suggests,55 the quarter-century following the US Supreme 
Court’s 1992 decision in Quill witnessed two parallel developments in the universe of 
online sales. The first was the explosive growth of the digital economy, which was just 
emerging when Quill was decided but had become a central and increasingly important 
feature of global economic activity by 2018. The second was the states’ persistent and 
increasingly innovative efforts to address the enforcement issues associated with Quill’s 
physical-presence rule, which one observer described as ‘a guerilla war with remote 
                                                     
50 Maria Koklanaris, ‘Minnesota Enacts Nation’s First Marketplace Nexus Provision’ (2017) 84 State Tax 
Notes 1012. 
51 H.F. 1, s 44(a), 
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bills/text.php?number=HF1&version=1&session=ls90&session_year=2017
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52 Engrossed House Bill 2163, Section 201(3), Chapter 28, Laws of 2017, 65th Legislature, 2017 3rd 
Special Session, approved 7 July 2017, http://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/biennium/2017-
18/Pdf/Bills/House%20Passed%20Legislature/2163.PL.pdf. 
53 RI Gen. Laws section 44-18.2-1(2) (Westlaw 2019) (emphasis supplied).  
54 See section 5.2. 
55 See section 3.3. 
 
 





sellers, developing expanded nexus and reporting laws designed to skirt the restrictions 
of Quill, and push online sellers to collect tax’.56  
Wholly apart from the ‘guerilla war’, several states adopted legislation or promulgated 
regulations in a frontal assault on the Quill decision. These statutes and regulations 
imposed sales and use tax collection obligations on sellers without physical presence in 
the state as long as their sales into the state exceeded a specified monetary or 
transactional threshold, thereby arguably establishing ‘economic nexus’57 with the 
state.58 Online retailers challenged the constitutionality of these provisions, including 
the South Dakota statute, which requires out-of-state sellers to collect tax ‘as if the seller 
had a physical presence in the state’,59 provided that the seller, on an annual basis, 
delivers more than USD 100,000 of goods or services into the state or engages in 200 
or more separate transactions for the delivery of goods into the state.60 The statute 
foreclosed retroactive application of those provisions until the constitutionality of the 
law was clearly established.61 The online retailers who challenged the South Dakota 
statute were among the largest online retailers in the United States and indisputably 
satisfied the statute’s requirements.62 
The South Dakota Supreme Court ruled that the statute was unconstitutional, observing 
that ‘[h]owever persuasive the State’s arguments on the merits of revisiting the issue, 
                                                     
56 Billy Hamilton, ‘The Problems of an Analog Tax in a Digital World’ (2018) 90 State Tax Notes 119. The 
observer further noted that ‘[c]onsiderable progress was made, particularly when Amazon.com, the world’s 
largest online retailer, began collecting tax in all states with a sales tax in 2017’: ibid. What the observer 
fails to note, however, is that Amazon began collecting tax only on Amazon’s own sales, not on sales made 
over Amazon’s online platform by the 800,000 FBA (fulfilled by Amazon sellers). For further discussion 
of that issue, see section 5.2 (discussing state tax collection obligations of marketplace platforms). 
57 In US subnational state tax parlance, ‘economic nexus’ signifies economic presence without regard to 
physical presence, which is analogous to ‘significant economic presence’ or ‘significant digital presence’ 
in the international tax context: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Tax 
Challenges Arising from Digitalisation – Interim Report 2018, Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD/G20 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD Publishing, 2018) ch 4.3; European Commission, Proposal 
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Exploitation of the State’s Market as a Basis for Asserting Jurisdiction Over Corporations with No Physical 
Presence in the State for Purposes of Income, Franchise, and Other Taxes on Business Activity’). 
58 See, eg, Ind. Code section 6-2.5-2-1(c) (Westlaw 2019) (gross revenue in excess of USD 100,000 or 
more than 200 separate sales transactions); RI Gen. Laws sections 44-18.2-1–44-18.2-10 (Westlaw 2019) 
(same); SD Codified Laws section 10-64-2 (Westlaw 2019) (same); Ala. Admin. Code r. 810-6-2-.90.03 
(Westlaw 2019) (sales in excess of USD 250,000); Miss. Admin. Code 35-IV-03.09 sections 101-103 
(Westlaw 2019) (same). See generally Matthew Szudajski, ‘The Rising Trend of Sales Tax Nexus 
Expansion’ (2017) 70(4) Tax Lawyer 907 (containing a detailed and comprehensive description of recent 
sales tax nexus developments).  
59 SD Codified Laws section 10-64-2 (Westlaw 2019) (emphasis supplied). 
60 Ibid.  
61 Ibid s 10-64-6. 
62 As the US Supreme Court observed, the retailers, Wayfair, Inc., Overstock.com, Inc., and Newegg, Inc.,  
are merchants with no employees or real estate in South Dakota. Wayfair, Inc., is a leading online 
retailer of home goods and furniture and had net revenues of over $4.7 billion last year. 
Overstock.com, Inc., is one of the top online retailers in the United States, selling a wide variety 
of products from home goods and furniture to clothing and jewelry; and it had net revenues of 
over $1.7 billion last year. Newegg, Inc., is a major online retailer of consumer electronics in the 
United States. Each of these three companies ships its goods directly to purchasers throughout 
the United States, including South Dakota. Each easily meets the minimum sales or transactions 
requirement of the Act, but none collects South Dakota sales tax. 
South Dakota v Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 (2018). 
 
 





Quill has not been overruled’, and ‘[w]e are mindful of the Supreme Court’s directive 
to follow its precedent when it “has direct application in a case” and to leave to the 
Court “the prerogative of overruling its own decisions”’.63 In South Dakota v Wayfair, 
Inc.,64 the US Supreme Court accepted the South Dakota Supreme Court’s invitation, 
overruled Quill and Bellas Hess as ‘unsound and incorrect’,65 and remanded the case 
for consideration of any Commerce Clause claims that may remain in the absence of 
Quill and Bellas Hess.66 
4.1 The US Supreme Court’s opinion in Wayfair 
The Court’s criticism of the physical-presence test was three-pronged. First, the Court’s 
earlier embrace of the test was ‘flawed on its own terms’,67 because the physical-
presence test is not a ‘necessary interpretation’68 of the substantial nexus requirement, 
creates rather than resolves market distortions, and disregards the more ‘“sensitive, 
case-by-case analysis”’69 of the Court’s modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 
Second, the physical-presence test is inconsistent with modern e-commerce and other 
‘“dramatic technological and social changes”’70 that allow sellers to penetrate state 
markets without establishing a physical presence. Third, the physical-presence test is 
‘an extraordinary imposition by the Judiciary on States’ authority to collect taxes and 
perform critical public functions’.71 
In finding that the Quill decision was ‘flawed on its own terms’,72 the Court emphasised 
that the Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause nexus requirements are ‘closely 
related’,73 and that although they ‘may not be identical or coterminous, … there are 
significant parallels’.74 It found that the reasons given in Quill for rejecting the physical-
presence rule for due process purposes ‘apply as well to the question whether physical 
presence is a requisite for an out-of-state seller’s liability to remit sales taxes’.75 
Addressing the argument that the physical-presence rule protects retailers from the 
burden of complying with tax collection obligations in thousands of different 
jurisdictions, the Wayfair Court noted that the ‘administrative costs of compliance … 
are largely unrelated to whether a company has a physical presence in a State’.76 Thus, 
the ‘[t]he physical presence rule is a poor proxy for the compliance cost faced by 
companies doing business in multiple states’.77 
                                                     
63 South Dakota v Wayfair, Inc., 901 NW2d 754, 761 (SD 2017) (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v 
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The Court further observed ‘that the Commerce Clause was designed to prevent States 
from engaging in economic discrimination … ’.78 Moreover, ‘it is certainly not the 
purpose of the Commerce Clause to permit the Judiciary to create market distortions’.79 
The physical-presence rule, however, ‘puts both local businesses and many interstate 
businesses with physical presence at a competitive disadvantage relative to remote 
sellers. Remote sellers can avoid the regulatory burden of tax collection and can offer 
de facto lower prices caused by the widespread failure of consumers to pay the tax on 
their own’.80 The physical-presence rule also ‘produces an incentive to avoid physical 
presence in multiple States’,81 thereby distorting business decisions regarding the 
allocation of resources and giving rise to economic inefficiencies. Thus, ‘[r]ejecting the 
physical presence rule is necessary to ensure that artificial competitive advantages are 
not created by this Court’s precedents’.82 
The Court also contrasted the formalism of Quill with the ‘sensitive, case-by-case 
analysis of purposes and effects’83 embodied in modern Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence. Quill, it noted, ‘treats economically identical actors differently, and for 
arbitrary reasons’.84 The Court demonstrated this point by comparing the compliance 
obligations of a small, yet physically present, online retailer with those of a large, remote 
online retailer making sales nationwide. Under Quill, the small retailer is required to 
remit tax while the large retailer is not. ‘This distinction simply makes no sense’, and 
‘courts should not rely on anachronistic formalisms’ to prevent a state from enforcing 
its tax laws so long as they ‘avoid[ ] “any effect forbidden by the Commerce Clause”’.85 
Turning to an examination of the physical-presence rule as applied to modern e-
commerce and noting that the Quill Court had characterised the rule as ‘artificial at its 
edges’,86 the Court declared that it is now ‘all the more evident that the physical presence 
rule is artificial in its entirety’.87 The Court observed: 
Between targeted advertising and instant access to most consumers via any 
internet-enabled device, ‘a business may be present in a State in a meaningful 
way without’ that presence ‘being physical in the traditional sense of the term’. 
A virtual showroom can show far more inventory, in far more detail, and with 
greater opportunities for consumer and seller interaction than might be possible 
for local stores. Yet the continuous and pervasive virtual presence of retailers 
today is, under Quill, simply irrelevant. This Court should not maintain a rule 
that ignores these substantial virtual connections to the State.88 
The Court also found that the physical-presence rule ‘is an extraordinary imposition by 
the Judiciary on the States’ authority to collect taxes and perform critical public 
functions’.89 It described the rule as not only unfair to business competitors, but also to 
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states seeking fair enforcement of their tax laws. Retaining the rule would allow many 
purchasers ‘to escape payment of … taxes that are essential to create and secure for 
remote sellers the market they supply with goods and services’.90 Moreover, ‘[i]t is 
essential to public confidence in the tax system that the Court avoid creating inequitable 
exceptions’.91 While the Court recognised the ‘legitimate concerns … for small 
businesses that make a small volume of sales to customers in many states’,92 it did not 
find these concerns to be sufficient justification for retaining an ‘artificial, anachronistic 
rule that deprives States of vast revenues from major businesses’.93 Rather, it pointed to 
other potential avenues of relief, such as developments in tax compliance software and 
the possibility of congressional legislation. 
Finally, the Court pointed to the advent of the digital economy as a crucial factor in its 
conclusion that Quill’s physical-presence rule ‘must give way’94 to a contemporary 
nexus standard.95 After acknowledging that ‘Quill was wrong on its own terms when it 
was decided in 1992’, the Court continued that ‘since then the Internet revolution has 
made its earlier error all the more egregious and harmful’.96 The Court elaborated on 
this point at some length, and it is worth quoting the Court’s observations because they 
reflect the US judicial perspective on the impact of the digital economy on tax collection 
obligations: 
The Quill Court did not have before it the present realities of the interstate 
marketplace. In 1992, less than 2 percent of Americans had Internet access. 
When it decided Quill, the Court could not have envisioned a world in which 
the world's largest retailer would be a remote seller. 
The Internet’s prevalence and power have changed the dynamics of the national 
economy. In 1992, mail-order sales in the United States totaled $180 billion. 
Last year, e-commerce retail sales alone were estimated at $453.5 billion. 
Combined with traditional remote sellers, the total exceeds half a trillion 
dollars. Since the Department of Commerce first began tracking e-commerce 
sales, those sales have increased tenfold from 0.8 percent to 8.9 percent of total 
retail sales in the United States. And it is likely that this percentage will 
increase. Last year, e-commerce grew at four times the rate of traditional retail, 
and it shows no sign of any slower pace.  
This expansion has also increased the revenue shortfall faced by States seeking 
to collect their sales and use taxes. In 1992, it was estimated that the States were 
losing between $694 million and $3 billion per year in sales tax revenues as a 
result of the physical presence rule. Now estimates range from $8 to $33 billion. 
The South Dakota Legislature has declared an emergency, which again 
demonstrates urgency of overturning the physical presence rule. 
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The argument, moreover, that the physical presence rule is clear and easy to 
apply is unsound. Attempts to apply the physical presence rule to online retail 
sales are proving unworkable. States are already confronting the complexities 
of defining physical presence in the Cyber Age. For example, Massachusetts 
proposed a regulation that would have defined physical presence to include 
making apps available to be downloaded by in-state residents and placing 
cookies on in-state residents’ web browsers. Ohio recently adopted a similar 
standard. Some States have enacted so-called ‘click through’ nexus statutes, 
which define nexus to include out-of-state sellers that contract with in-state 
residents who refer customers for compensation. Others still, like Colorado, 
have imposed notice and reporting requirements on out-of-state retailers that 
fall just short of actually collecting and remitting the tax. Statutes of this sort 
are likely to embroil courts in technical and arbitrary disputes about what counts 
as physical presence.97 
Once the Court had overruled the physical-presence rule, the Court’s only remaining 
task was to apply the Commerce Clause nexus test – which ‘simply asks whether the 
tax applies to an activity with a substantial nexus with the state’98 – to the South Dakota 
statute. Quoting an earlier decision, the Court found that ‘“such a nexus is established 
when the taxpayer [or collector] ‘avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on 
business’ in that jurisdiction”’.99 The decision followed easily: 
Here, the nexus is clearly sufficient based on both the economic and virtual 
contacts respondents have with the State. The Act applies only to sellers that 
deliver more than $100,000 of goods or services into South Dakota or engage 
in 200 or more separate transactions for the delivery of goods and services into 
the State on an annual basis. This quantity of business could not have occurred 
unless the seller availed itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on 
business in South Dakota. And respondents are large, national companies that 
undoubtedly maintain an extensive virtual presence. Thus, the substantial nexus 
requirement … is satisfied in this case.100 
4.2 Constitutional nexus after Wayfair 
The constitutional nexus standard for requiring remote vendors to comply with states’ 
sales and use tax collection obligations after Wayfair is whether the vendor has 
purposefully ‘availed itself’ of the ‘privilege’ or ‘benefit’ of carrying on business in the 
state’s economic market. In Wayfair, the Court articulated the Commerce Clause nexus 
standard for imposing tax collection obligations on remote vendors as whether the 
taxpayer or tax collector ‘avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on 
business’ in the state.101 This was substantially the same as the Due Process Clause 
nexus standard the Court had earlier articulated in Quill (and reaffirmed in Wayfair), 
namely, whether the ‘foreign corporation purposefully avails itself of the benefits of an 
economic market in the … State’.102 As the Court indicated in Wayfair, these questions 
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may be answered by reference to the taxpayer’s or tax collector’s ‘economic and virtual 
contacts’103 with the state. 
One does not have to be a tax professional to recognise that the foregoing standards 
provide little concrete guidance to state tax administrators and state tax advisors as to 
the nature and level of ‘economic and virtual’ contacts that will satisfy constitutional 
nexus norms for remote sellers. The only thing we know for sure about these norms as 
of mid-2019 is that sellers that deliver ‘more than $100,000 of goods or services’ into a 
state or ‘engage in 200 or more separate transactions’ in a state on an annual basis have 
‘economic and virtual contacts’ with the state that are ‘clearly sufficient’ to satisfy 
constitutional standards. 
Having said that, one must also underscore several other things we also know for certain 
at this juncture that will be critical in shaping the framework governing remote vendors’ 
tax collection obligations in the wake of Wayfair. First, vendors’ tax collection 
obligations will depend critically on the specific criteria set forth in state sales and use 
tax statutes (such as those embodied in the South Dakota statute at issue in Wayfair) and 
not merely on the vague constitutional criterion of purposeful ‘availment’ of a state’s 
economic market that circumscribes state tax enforcement authority. Indeed, there is 
already strong evidence that states will embrace thresholds similar to those in the South 
Dakota statute as a safe harbour from post-Wayfair constitutional challenges.104 Second, 
the Court’s decision in Wayfair may well spur congressional action to impose 
nationwide standards governing states’ power to require remote vendors to collect sales 
and use taxes on interstate trade. Third, the inevitable litigation over the application of 
the Wayfair nexus standards is likely to add some flesh to the bare bones of the criteria 
set forth in the Court’s opinion.  
In connection with the third point, it is worth noting that the Court, after holding that 
‘the substantial nexus requirement … is satisfied in this case’,105 went on to observe that 
‘[t]he question remains whether some other principle in the Court’s Commerce Clause 
doctrine might invalidate the Act’.106 Because the pre-existing physical-presence rule 
had been an ‘obvious barrier’107 to enforcement of the South Dakota statute, the Court 
observed that these other aspects of the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine (apart from 
the substantial nexus requirement) that prevent discrimination against or undue burdens 
upon interstate commerce, had not been litigated or briefed. The Court accordingly 
remanded the case for consideration of such claims.108  
In so doing, however, the Court strongly implied that such claims would not be 
persuasive on the facts presented and, more importantly, effectively provided guidance 
to other states as to how to design tax regimes that will survive Commerce Clause 
scrutiny in a post-Wayfair world. Specifically, the Court identified several features of 
                                                     
103 See text accompanying n 100, above. 
104 See section 5. 
105 South Dakota v Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018). 
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South Dakota’s tax system ‘that appear designed to prevent discrimination against or 
undue burdens upon interstate commerce’.109 
First, the nexus statute provided a safe harbour for those who transact only limited 
business in the state. Second, the statute did not apply retroactively. Third, South Dakota 
was one of more than 20 states that have adopted the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax 
Agreement, which ‘standardizes taxes to reduce administrative and compliance 
costs’.110 As the Court elaborated:  
It requires a single, state level tax administration, uniform definitions of 
products and services, simplified tax rate structures, and other uniform rules. It 
also provides sellers access to sales tax administration software paid for by the 
State. Sellers who choose to use such software are immune from audit 
liability.111 
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that the Court’s embrace in Wayfair of a nexus 
rule based on ‘economic and virtual contacts’112 with a state did not render physical 
presence irrelevant to the nexus inquiry. To be sure,  the introduction to this article 
observed that the Court’s replacement of a nexus rule based entirely on physical 
presence with one based on ‘economic and virtual contacts’ consigned much of the 
earlier ‘US experience’ in the collection of tax on online sales ‘to the dustbin of 
history’.113 It was careful qualify this observation, however, with the caveat ‘at least for 
those with no physical presence in a state’.114 Physical presence is surely an ‘economic 
contact’, and it remains relevant to – albeit not controlling of – the nexus inquiry, 
although the precise significance of physical presence in the post-Wayfair world, and 
its relationship to virtual presence in establishing nexus, will undoubtedly be a focus of 
further analysis and controversy. 
5. THE STATES’ RESPONSE TO WAYFAIR 
It may seem premature to be examining the states’ response to Wayfair a little more than 
a year after the Court’s decision inasmuch as state legislators and tax administrators do 
not ordinarily respond rapidly to external developments. But Wayfair is the exception 
that proves the rule. The ink was barely dry on the Court’s opinion in Wayfair before 
state legislatures and state tax administrators began to respond to the implications of the 
decision for their authority to collect taxes from online and other remote sellers. The 
balance of this article examines these responses, with the full knowledge that they 
continue every day (often to modify or fine-tune a previous response). For that reason, 
readers interested in the current ‘state of play’ in this domain are advised to consult one 
of the sources cited in the notes offering up-to-date summaries of states’ statutory and 
administrative responses to Wayfair.115 
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5.1 State legislative and administrative responses to Wayfair directed at remote sellers 
As suggested above,116 the Court in Wayfair effectively provided the states with three 
guiding principles for designing legislation or administrative guidance that would carry 
with it a strong presumption of constitutionality in a post-Wayfair world: 
 first, adopt a threshold of selling more than USD 100,000 of goods or services 
into the state or engage in 200 or more separate transactions for delivery of 
goods or services into the state on an annual basis, because this quantity of 
business could not occur unless the seller avails itself of the substantial 
privilege of carrying on business in the state; 
 second, do not apply the standard retroactively; 
 third, adopt the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA) (if the 
state has not already done so) or equivalent measures that standardise taxes to 
reduce administrative and compliance costs and provide sellers with access to 
sales tax administration software paid for by the state and immunising sellers 
who use such software from audit liability.  
Based on the states’ responses to Wayfair thus far, the states have taken these guiding 
principles to heart, as reflected in Table 1, which reflects state legislative and 
administrative guidance as of July 2019.117 
 
  
                                                     
has organised a ‘Wayfair Implementation and Marketplace Facilitator Work Group’ which ‘is intended to 
discuss and develop concepts or ideas for consideration by states desiring to require marketplace facilitators 
to collect and remit sales/use tax on marketplace sales, in order to maximize compliance while minimizing 
the burden on marketplace facilitators and marketplace sellers’: see http://www.mtc.gov/getdoc/d3f9e214-
6006-4f76-bca2-7287be89dd06/Wayfair-Implementation-Informational-Project.aspx. The group has 
scheduled weekly teleconferences and the web site is an invaluable source of information for the current 
state of ‘post-Wayfair’ play regarding remote sellers and marketplace facilitators (platforms). See also 
below n 117. 
116 See section 4.2. 
117 The guidance is based on sources cited above, n 115, as well as other sources of information, including: 
Bloomberg  BNA, Daily Tax Report: State, https://www.bna.com/tax; CCH, State Tax Day, 
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https://www.checkpoint.thomsonreuters.com. Needless to say, readers should view the ensuing description 
as the current ‘snapshot’ of the state of play as of July 2019, and should assume that the picture may – and, 
in some cases clearly will – have changed by the time they read this article. In this connection, readers are 





















Alabama $250,000 (goods 
only) 
Not applicable Oct. 1, 2018 No 
Arizona $200,000 for 2019 
$150,000 for 2020 
$100,00 for 2021 
Not applicable  No 
Arkansas $100,000 200 July 1, 2019 Yes 
California $500,000 200 Apr. 1, 2019 No 
Colorado $100,000 Not applicable Dec. 1, 2018 No 
Connecticut $250,000 200 Dec. 1, 2018 No 
District of 
Columbia 
$100,000 200 Jan. 1, 2019 No 
Georgia $200,000 (goods 
only) 
200 (goods only) Jan. 1, 2019 Yes 
Hawaii $100,000 200 July 1, 2018 No 
Idaho $100,000 Not applicable June 1, 2019 No 
Illinois $100,000 200 Oct. 1, 2018 No 
Indiana $100,000 200 Oct. 1, 2018 Yes 
Iowa $100,000 Not applicable Jan. 1, 2019 Yes 
Kentucky $100,000 200 Oct. 1, 2018 Yes 
Louisiana $100,000 200 Jan. 1, 2019 No 
Maine $100,000 200 July 1, 2018 No 
Maryland $100,000 200 Oct. 1, 2018 No 
Massachusetts $500,000 and 100 Oct. 1, 2017 No 
Michigan $100,000 200 Oct. 1, 2018 Yes 
Minnesota $100,000  200 Oct. 1, 2018 Yes 
Mississippi $250,000 Not applicable Sept. 1, 2018 No 
Nebraska $100,000 200 Jan. 1, 2019 Yes 
Nevada $100,000 200 Nov. 1, 2018 Yes 
New Jersey $100,000 200 Nov. 1, 2018 Yes 
North Carolina $100,000 200 Nov. 1, 2018 Yes 
North Dakota $100,000 200 Oct. 1, 2018 Yes 
Ohio $100,000 200 Aug. 1, 2019 Yes 
Oklahoma $100,000 Not applicable July 1, 2018 Yes 
Pennsylvania $100,000 Not applicable Mar. 1, 2018 No 
Rhode Island $100,000 200 Aug. 17, 2017 Yes 
South Carolina $100,000 Not applicable Nov. 1, 2018 No 
South Dakota $100,000 200 Nov. 1, 2018 Yes 
Tennessee $500,000 Not applicable July 1, 2019 Associate 
Member 
Utah $100,000 200 Jan. 1, 2019 Yes 
Vermont $100,000 200 July 1, 2018 Yes 
Washington $100,000 Not applicable Oct. 1, 2018 Yes 
 
 






*Some states have modified their “effective date” rules since the original adoption of their 
remote seller nexus rules, and one should consult current state statutes and administrative 
guidance to determine if the original effective date has been modified. 
 
5.2 State marketplace platform legislation 
As noted above,118 during the year before Wayfair was decided, states had begun to 
enact legislation imposing tax collection and reporting obligations on marketplace 
platforms in connection with online sales. As originally conceived, the legislation was 
designed in large part to deal with the then existing physical-presence nexus restraint 
on requiring remote vendors to collect tax on interstate sales. The platforms’ tax 
collection obligations were accordingly based, at least in part, on the platforms’ physical 
presence in the state or, alternatively, on their election to comply with notice and 
reporting obligations, which could be imposed in the absence of physical presence, or 
to collect the tax due.119  
Despite the continuing (and, indeed, increasing) significance of platforms in connection 
with enforcement of tax on online sales, the Court’s decision in Wayfair fundamentally 
changed the constitutional premises underlying the original design of state platform 
legislation. These changes have had a substantial impact on the structure of pre-existing 
legislation and of the platform legislation that has been adopted by a large number of 
states since Wayfair was decided. The ensuing discussion examines state legislation 
directed at marketplace platforms.120 
5.2.1 Overview 
The precise details and operation of state platform regimes vary from state to state.121 It 
may be therefore helpful at the outset to provide an overview of the general features of 
state platform legislation. 
Viewed in most general terms, state platform legislation is directed at three categories 
of actors: (1) the platforms themselves, ie, the entities that operate the marketplaces 
(often called ‘marketplace facilitators’ or ‘marketplace providers’); (2) referrers, those 
who bring buyers and sellers together to consummate a sale over a platform but do not 
collect receipts from the buyer; and (3) remote sellers, including those who sell over 
platforms, sometimes called ‘marketplace sellers’. These categories of actors are not 
airtight. While platforms typically are online marketplaces that list third parties’ 
products for sale on their websites, in many circumstances platforms not only facilitate 
sales of third parties’ products but also sell products of their own. Referrers may operate 
                                                     
118 See section 3.3.3. 
119 See section 3.3.2. 
120 The following discussion draws freely from Hellerstein et al, above n 5, 19.08[7] and Hellerstein et al, 
‘Platforms: The Sequel’, above n 49. For the most recent version of this article, which contains an up-to-
date description of state marketplace platform legislation as of December 2019, see Walter Hellerstein, 
John A Swain and Jonathan E Maddison, ‘Platforms: The Finale’ (2020) Tax Notes State 11 (6 January). 
121 See section 5.2.2. 
West Virginia $100,000 200 Jan. 1, 2019 Yes 
Wisconsin $100,000 200 Oct. 1, 2018 Yes 
Wyoming $100,000 200 Feb. 1, 2019 Yes 
 
 





as marketplace platforms or as sellers in their own right with respect to some of the 
transactions in which they engage, potentially triggering different reporting or collection 
obligations for specified classes of transactions. Remote sellers, as just noted, may or 
may not sell over platforms, and that distinction can be critical in determining their 
exposure to tax collection or reporting obligations. Platform legislation raises the 
following basic questions regarding the platform-related obligations imposed on 
platforms, referrers, and marketplace sellers.122  
1. Does the law impose a collection and/or reporting obligation on the actor 
in question? Does the actor have a choice between the two? 
As a matter of logic, one might have assumed that platform legislation would simply 
impose a tax collection obligation on platform-related actors under appropriate 
circumstances. But, as noted in the preceding discussion,123 the ‘page of history’ that 
outweighed the suggested logic was the constitutional distinction courts had drawn, 
prior to the Court’s decision in Wayfair, between states’ constitutional power to impose 
tax collection obligations, which required the tax collector’s physical presence in the 
state, and states’ constitutional power to impose tax reporting obligations, which did 
not. State platform legislation adopted prior to the Wayfair decision often reflects that 
distinction, which contributes to its complexity.  
Going forward, however, one would think that the days of information reporting and 
notice regimes will be numbered for platform-related actors that exceed the economic 
nexus thresholds endorsed by Wayfair, because they can now constitutionally be 
compelled to collect the tax, and there is no need for states to adopt reporting and notice 
regimes as a mechanism for inducing collection. Notice and information report statutes 
will still have relevance, however, to the extent they apply to persons who are not 
required to collect and report tax as a matter of state law, for example, persons falling 
beneath the state’s quantitative nexus thresholds and ‘referrers’, as defined by state 
‘platform’ statutes, who are sometimes required to provide customer notice and 
information reports even though they are not treated as taxpayers or tax collectors.  
2. Does the law extend to all taxable transactions or only to sales of tangible 
personal property? 
Although state sales and use taxes have historically been confined largely to sales of 
tangible personal property, marketplace platforms facilitate sales not only of tangible 
personal property but also of an increasing volume of services and ‘digital products’,124 
many of which are subject to tax. The platform legislation enacted in some states applies 
broadly to all taxable transactions, whereas other states’ platform legislation is confined 
to tangible personal property. From a practical perspective, requiring platforms to 
collect tax on sales of taxable services and digital products may create burdens for 
                                                     
122 Because platform-related obligations constitute the focus of this discussion, it does not consider the 
imposition of obligations imposed on remote sellers by platform-related legislation except insofar as such 
obligations arise by virtue of remote sellers’ relationship to marketplace platforms (including referrers). 
State legislation directed at remote sellers wholly apart from their relationship to marketplace platforms is 
considered in section 5.1.  
123 See section 3.3.2. 
124 See Hellerstein et al, above n 5, 19A.04[2][c][ii] (discussing Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement 
(SSUTA) definition of ‘digital products’). 
 
 





platforms in determining what services and digital products are subject to tax in each 
state as well as determining the state in which such services or digital products are sold. 
3. Is there a sales, transaction, or similar threshold for determining the point 
at which a platform-related actor acquires a tax collection or reporting 
obligation? 
Virtually all platform legislation to date includes a threshold or thresholds that trigger 
tax collection or reporting obligations, and this trend will almost certainly continue in 
light of the Supreme Court’s explicit reference to the existence of thresholds as one of 
the reasons for sustaining the constitutionality of the remote seller collection statute at 
issue in Wayfair. 
5.2.2 State marketplace platform legislation 
Since May 2017, 34 states and the District of Columbia have enacted marketplace 
platform legislation. Moreover, legislation is pending or is likely to be introduced in the 
diminishing number of states that have not yet enacted such legislation.125 Table 2 
summarises state marketplace platform legislation in effect as of July 2019. 
 






Marketplace Facilitators Referrers 
Obligations Thresholds Obligations Thresholds 
Alabama 
(Dec. 1, 2019) 
Collect and remit $250,00 
aggregate 
platform sales 
Not applicable Not applicable 
Arizona 
(Oct. 1, 2019) 
Collect and remit $100,000 
aggregate 
platform sales 
Not applicable Not applicable 
Arkansas 
(July 1, 2019) 





Not applicable Not applicable 
California 
(Oct. 1, 2019) 
Collect and remit $500,000 
aggregate 
platform sales 
Not applicable Not applicable 
Colorado 
(Oct. 1, 2019) 
 
Collect and remit $100,000 
aggregate 
platform sales 
Not applicable Not applicable 
                                                     
125 See above nn 115 and 117. Indeed, between July 2019, when this article was drafted, and December 
2019 when this article was finalised, an additional four states adopted platform legislation. Accordingly, as 
of this moment 38 states and the District of Columbia have enacted marketplace platform legislation. See 
above, n 120. 
 
 






(Dec. 1, 2018) 
Collect and remit $250,000 
aggregate 
platform sales 
Collect and remit 














 (Apr. 1, 2019) 





Not applicable Not applicable 
Hawaii 
(Jan. 1, 2020) 





Not applicable Not applicable 
Idaho 
(June 1, 2019) 
Collect and remit $100,000 
aggregate 
platform sales 
Not applicable Not applicable 
Illinois 
(Jan. 1, 2020) 





Not applicable Not applicable 
Indiana 
(July 1, 2019) 





Not applicable Not applicable 
Iowa 
(Jan. 1, 2019) 





Collect or remit 












(July 1, 2019) 





Not applicable Not applicable 
Maine 
(Oct. 1, 2019) 





Not applicable Not applicable 
 
 






(Oct. 1, 2018) 





Not applicable Not applicable 
Nebraska 
(Apr. 1, 2019) 






Not applicable Not applicable 
Nevada 
(Oct. 1, 2019) 



















(Nov. 1, 2018) 
Collect and remit none Not applicable Not applicable 
New Mexico 
(Oct. 1, 2019) 




Not applicable Not applicable 
New York 
(June 1, 2019) 





Not applicable Not applicable 
North Dakota 
(Oct. 1, 2019) 
Collect and remit $100,000 
aggregate 
platform sales 
Not applicable Not applicable 
Ohio 
(August 1, 2019) 





Not applicable Not applicable 
Oklahoma 
(July 1, 2018) 
Collect and remit 







Collect and remit 









(Mar. 1, 2018) 
Collect and remit $100,000 
aggregate 
platform sales 
Not applicable Not applicable 
Rhode Island 
(July 1, 2019) 
Collect and remit $100,000 
aggregate 
platform sales 
Collect and remit $100,000 
aggregate 












(Apr. 1, 2019) 
Collect and remit none Not applicable Not applicable 
South Dakota 
(Mar. 1, 2019) 





Not applicable Not applicable 
Texas 
(Oct. 1, 2019) 
 
Collect and remit $500,000 
aggregate 
platform sales 
Not applicable Not applicable 
Utah 
(Oct. 1, 2019) 





Not applicable Not applicable 
Vermont 
(June 1, 2019) 
 





Not applicable Not applicable 
Virginia 
(July 1, 2019) 





Not applicable Not applicable 
Washington 
(Jan. 1, 2018) 
Collect and remit $100,000 
aggregate 
platform sales  
Not applicable Not applicable 
West Virginia 
(July 1, 2019) 





Collect and remit $100,000 
aggregate 
platform sales or 
200 transactions 
Wisconsin 
(Oct. 1, 2019) 





Not applicable Not applicable 
Wyoming 
(July 1, 2019) 





Not applicable Not applicable 
 
* Some states have modified their “effective date” rules since the original adoption of their 
remote seller nexus rules, and one should consult current state statutes and administrative 
guidance to determine if the original effective date has been modified. 
 
 





6. WAYFAIR AND FOREIGN SUPPLIERS 
6.1 The principle of equal treatment of international and interstate trade and foreign and 
domestic suppliers 
Under US constitutional principles, international cross-border trade and non-US 
suppliers must be treated no worse (and, arguably, no better) than interstate cross-border 
trade and US suppliers.126 Accordingly, the preceding discussion regarding the states’ 
power to require remote sellers and marketplaces to collect tax on online sales in the 
context of cross-border trade applies equally to interstate and international cross-border 
trade and to US and non-US suppliers, at least as a matter of principle.  
6.2 Practical differences in the states’ ability to enforce tax collection obligations upon remote 
interstate sellers as compared to remote international sellers 
Despite the theoretical parity between interstate and international cross-border trade and 
US and non-US suppliers, there may be significant practical differences in the states’ 
ability to enforce remote suppliers’ legal obligations to collect taxes on online sales in 
the context of international as compared to interstate trade. A simple hypothetical 
reveals the fundamental difference in ‘enforcement jurisdiction’127 in the interstate and 
international contexts. Assume that two suppliers, Supplier C-A from Country A and 
Supplier S-A from State A, make online sales into State B in excess of State B’s 
$100,000 ‘distance selling’ threshold for incurring an obligation to collect tax on sales 
into State B, a threshold the US Supreme Court has effectively approved as 
constitutionally justified in Wayfair. Assume further that neither Supplier C-A nor 
Supplier S-A has any physical presence or assets in State B. Finally, assume that both 
Supplier C-A and Supplier S-A ignore their tax collection obligations under State B law 
and do not respond to collection or audit notices. 
In the context of the interstate sales made by Supplier S-A into State B, assuming that 
State B tax authorities have prima facie evidence of Supplier S-A’s sales exceeding the 
State B threshold, the State B tax authorities could proceed to file suit in State B courts 
seeking a judgment for the amount of taxes that Supplier S-A failed to collect on its 
State B sales. Assuming that Supplier S-A representatives did not appear in court to 
contest the claim, the State B courts would presumably issue a default judgment in 
favour of State B tax authorities. Armed with that judgment, the State B tax authorities 
could file suit against Supplier S-A in State A courts seeking to enforce the State B 
judgment against Supplier S-A. Under the US Constitution’s ‘Full Faith and Credit 
                                                     
126 See Hellerstein et al, above n 5, 4.21-4.24. 
127 In earlier work, the author has drawn a distinction between ‘substantive jurisdiction’ and ‘enforcement 
jurisdiction’: see Walter Hellerstein, ‘Jurisdiction to Tax in the Digital Economy: Permanent and Other 
Establishments’ (2014) 68(6/7) Bulletin for International Taxation 346; Walter Hellerstein, ‘Jurisdiction to 
Impose and Enforce Income and Consumption Taxes: Towards a Unified Conception of Tax Nexus?’ in 
Michael Lang, Peter Melz and Eleonor Kristoffersson (eds), Value Added Tax and Direct Taxation: 
Similarities and Differences (IBFD Publications, 2009) 545; Walter Hellerstein, ‘Jurisdiction to Tax 
Income and Consumption in the New Economy: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective’ (2003) 38(1) 
Georgia Law Review 1. ‘Substantive jurisdiction’ to tax relates to the power of a country to impose tax on 
the subject matter of the exaction, such as a country’s power  to impose a VAT on goods or services 
purchased from a supplier established outside the country but delivered or consumed within the country. 
‘Enforcement jurisdiction’ relates to the power of a country to compel collection of the tax over which it 
has ‘substantive’ tax jurisdiction. Enforcement jurisdiction includes such questions as whether a country 









Clause’, which provides that ‘Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the 
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State’,128 State A courts 
would be required to honour the State B court’s judgment in the absence of evidence 
that the judgment was obtained improperly.129 State B tax authorities would then be able 
to satisfy their judgment by obtaining a lien on Supplier S-A’s property in State A or, 
more likely, entering into a settlement agreement under which Supplier S-A paid the 
amounts due and agreed to comply with State B’s tax collection laws in the future. 
But now consider the international cross-border sales made by Supplier C-A into State 
B. Although the State B tax authorities would be able to obtain a default judgment 
against Supplier C-A in State B courts in the same manner that they would be able to 
obtain such a judgment against Supplier S-A, if Supplier C-A has no property in other 
US states, the default judgment would be of little value to the State B tax authorities.  
That is because of the so-called ‘revenue rule’, under which ‘no country ever takes 
notice of the revenue law of another’.130 Accordingly, unless the United States and 
Country A have entered into an agreement that overrides the revenue rule and recognises 
the countries’ respective tax judgments on a reciprocal basis, Country A courts will not 
recognise the State B court judgment against Supplier C-A.  
The United States is a signatory to the Multilateral Convention on Mutual 
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters,131 under which countries generally agree to 
override the revenue rule and assist other countries with the recovery of their tax claims 
‘as if they were its own tax claims’.132 However, in ratifying the Convention, the United 
States issued a ‘Reservation’ declining to comply with the mutual tax recovery 
provisions.133 Furthermore, although some US bilateral tax treaties agree to reciprocal 
enforcement of tax judgments,134 these provisions (like most provisions of US bilateral 
tax treaties, with the exception of the non-discrimination provision) apply only to 
national-level income taxes.135 Finally, insofar as states have adopted uniform 
legislation providing for recognition of foreign country judgments in their courts with 
the hope that this will ‘make it more likely that money judgments rendered in that state 
would be recognized in foreign countries’,136 the legislation provides an exception for 
‘a judgment for taxes’ (reflecting the revenue rule),137 although some states provide that 
                                                     
128 US Constitution, article IV, section 1. 
129 Milwaukee County v M.E. White Co., 296 US 268, 279 (1935) (‘a judgment is not to be denied full faith 
and credit in state and federal courts merely because it is for taxes’). 
130 Holman v Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (1775). As the US Supreme Court observed in Pasquantino 
v United States, 544 US 349, 360-361 (2005), ‘[s]ince the late 19th and early 20th century, courts have 
treated the common-law revenue rule as a corollary of the rule that, … “[t]he Courts of no country execute 
the penal laws of another”’ (citation omitted). 
131 OECD and Council of Europe, The Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax 
Matters: Amended by the 2010 Protocol (2011).  
132 Ibid art 11.  
133 Reservations and Declarations for Treaty No. 127 -- Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance 
in Tax Matters (as of 06/02/2019) (United States of America) (‘The United States will not provide 
assistance in the recovery of any tax claim … pursuant to Article 11 … of the Convention’), 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/127/declarations?desktop=true. 
134 Brian Kirkell and Mo Bell-Jacobs, ‘E-Flight Risk? Wayfair and the Revenue Rule’ (2018) 89 State Tax 
Notes 551, 552. 
135 Hellerstein et al, above n 5, 20.10[7][b]. 
136 Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, Prefatory Note, 1, 
https://www.uniformlaws.org. 
137 Ibid s 3(b)(1).  
 
 





recognition of foreign tax judgments is permissible but not required.138  Consequently, 
‘US courts are unlikely to enforce tax judgments of foreign courts, and foreign courts 
are highly likely to respond in kind’.139 In short, it is highly unlikely that State B tax 
authorities will be able to enforce a default judgment obtained in State B courts against 
Supplier C-A in Country A courts.  
However, this is not the end of the ‘enforcement jurisdiction’ story for foreign suppliers. 
Despite the significant differences in the legal and practical mechanisms available to 
state tax authorities in enforcing tax obligations upon foreign as distinguished from 
domestic suppliers, states nevertheless have a variety of tools at their disposal to enforce 
or encourage tax collection by foreign suppliers, and there are other reasons why foreign 
suppliers may choose to comply with state collection requirements with respect to 
online sales.   
First, although the above hypothetical scenario assumed (and still assumes) that 
Supplier C-A has no presence or assets in State B, if Supplier C-A has assets in any of 
the other US states, then State B tax authorities would ordinarily be in a position to 
enforce their claim against Supplier C-A. As in the case of Supplier S-A, the State B tax 
authorities would file the default judgment obtained in State B courts against Supplier 
C-A in a court in a state in which Supplier C-A does have property, obtain a judgment 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause (as implemented by the Uniform Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments Act, which has been adopted by 49 states and the District of 
Columbia),140 and obtain a lien on Supplier C-A’s property in that state. 
In this connection, it is important to recognise that Supplier C-A, though organised and 
operating primarily outside the United States, may well have property in various US 
states. For example, it might have inventory on its way to customers in US distribution 
centres and US bank accounts or other financial assets in the hands of credit card 
companies, payment processors, and other financial intermediaries.141 Assuming that 
Supplier C-A made sales into Ohio in excess of the Wayfair threshold, failed to comply 
with its Ohio tax collection obligations, and  had funds in a New York bank, ‘Ohio can 
collect tax from a foreign vendor by enforcing its judgment against the funds it holds in 
a New York bank’.142 Indeed, in this connection it has been noted that the US Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) requires payment processors to file a form ‘informing the IRS 
of payments made to vendors when the amount exceeds $20,000 and the vendor has 
engaged in more than 200 transactions’;143 the IRS routinely shares this information 
with the states; and once the state tax authorities obtain access to such information, they 
are in a position ‘to assess tax on amounts due to the vendor from the payment 
processor’.144  
                                                     
138 Kirkell and Bell-Jacobs, above n 134, 552-553. 
139 Ibid 553. 
140 Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, https://www.uniformlaws.org. 
141 See Glenn Newman, ‘Offshore Retailers Can’t Hide From Sales Tax Collection’ (2018) 92 Tax Notes 
International 1309. 
142 Adam Thimmesch, Darien Shanske and David Gamage, ‘Wayfair: Marketplaces and Foreign Vendors’ 
(2018) 90 State Tax Notes 18, 20. 
143 See Newman, above n 141, 1310. 
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Second, with the dominant role that a small number of marketplace platforms play in 
facilitating international cross-border online sales,145 most online sales by foreign 
suppliers are likely to involve such marketplaces. Moreover, there has been a strong and 
continuing trend in state legislation imposing tax collection obligations upon sales 
facilitated by marketplace platforms146 – obligations with which the large marketplaces 
are already complying147 and will almost certainly continue to in the future, especially 
if the states’ marketplace tax collection regimes are designed to be as simple and 
efficient as possible.148 In short, there is good reason to be sanguine about the prospects 
for enforcement of tax collection obligations with respect to foreign suppliers’ 
marketplace-facilitated sales.  
Third, wholly apart from the foreign suppliers’ marketplace-facilitated sales, there may 
be reason to be hopeful about the prospects for foreign suppliers’ compliance with their 
obligations to collect tax on their direct sales into states where they exceed the states’ 
thresholds. As several observers have noted: 
This is not just a matter of altruism, but good sense for the business and the 
individual managers. A large state tax liability will show up on financial 
statements and will hover over any future plans to operate in the United States. 
It seems improbable that large vendors are likely to ignore the laws of states in 
which they make substantial sales.149 
Finally, it may be worth addressing, at least in passing, the possibility that border 
controls (US Customs and Border Protection) might be able to assist the states in 
enforcing the foreign sellers’ state tax obligations with respect to sales of imported 
goods, just as such customs authorities have traditionally assisted in the collection of 
VAT/GST with respect to imported goods.150 The short answer, which no doubt reflects 
the strong ‘federal’ tradition in the US and the respect for the ‘independence’ of the 
national and subnational governments’ respective tax regimes, is that the federal 
                                                     
145 According to the International Post Corporation, ‘Cross-Border E-Commerce Shopper Survey 2018’ 
(January 2019), https://www.ipc.be/services/markets-and-regulations/cross-border-shopper-survey, four 
marketplace platforms (Amazon, Alibaba/AliExpress, Ebay, and Wish) accounted for 64 per cent of cross-
border e-commerce in the 41 markets surveyed. 
146 See section 5.2. 
147 For example, Amazon’s website declares: 
Marketplace Facilitator is defined as a marketplace that contracts with third party sellers to 
promote their sale of physical property, digital goods, and services through the marketplace. As 
a result, Amazon is deemed to be a marketplace facilitator for third-party sales facilitated through 
www.amazon.com. 
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‘Marketplace Tax Collection’, 
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Marketplace Facilitator legislation is in effect). 
148 See Walter Hellerstein, Stephane Buydens and Dimitra Koulouri, ‘Simplified Registration and 
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Assessment’ (OECD Taxation Working Papers No. 39, 2018), https://www.oecd-
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149 Thimmesch et al., above n 142, 21. 
150 OECD, International VAT/GST Guidelines (2017) para. 1.13 
 
 





government provides minimal assistance to the states with respect to collection of state 
sales tax on imported goods. The US Customs and Border Protection’s website provides 
the following information: 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) does not collect state sales tax on goods 
imported into the US. However, CBP will make entries and CBP declarations 
available to state tax representatives if requested. Some states occasionally 
review these documents and send letters to importers and travelers notifying 
them that they owe state taxes.151 
7. CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the most fitting observation that one can make at the end of this odyssey through 
the US experience and recent developments in the collection of tax on online sales, and 
its implications for Australian businesses, is that by the time anyone reads these words 
the discussion will need to be updated in light of the continuing evolution of the states’ 
responses to Wayfair and the ever-expanding digital economy. But that is an observation 
that one could presumably make about virtually any discussion of developments in the 
digital economy. Accordingly, there is no reason either to be surprised or – at least for 
those whose knowledge of these ongoing developments puts food on their plates – 
dismayed. Rather it constitutes compelling counsel to stay tuned, because there is more 
to come.  
 
 
                                                     
151 Customs and Border Patrol Information Center, ‘Does Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Collect 
State Sales Tax On Imported Goods?’, https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/295/~/taxes-on-
imported-goods. 
